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The unprecedented consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic have raised concerns about intensified
social unrest, but evidence for such a link and the underlying channels is still lacking. We use a unique
combination of nationally representative survey data, event data on social unrest, and data on Covid-19
fatalities and unemployment at a weekly resolution to investigate the forces behind social unrest in the
context of the strains on public health and the economy due to the pandemic in the USA. The results show
that pandemic-related unemployment and Covid-19 fatalities intensified negative emotional stress and led
to a deterioration of economic confidence among individuals. The prevalence of negative emotional stress,
particularly in economically strained and politically polarized environments, was, in turn, associated with
intensified social unrest as measured by political protests. No such link is found for economic perceptions.
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1 Introduction
The Covid-19 pandemic had unprecedented effects on public health and the economy. The pandemic caused
more fatalities in the U.S. than all wars during the past century. The lockdown led to severe restrictions
of civil liberties, brought the economy to a standstill, and resulted in the highest unemployment since the
Great Depression. This has raised concerns of an intensification of social instability and social unrest.1
Recent evidence indeed documented a deterioration of mental health, increasing depression rates, and an
increase in household violence as consequences of the pandemic. Evidence whether this was also associated
with an increase in social unrest is still lacking, however.
In this note, we provide novel evidence for a link between the Covid-19 pandemic and outbreaks of social
unrest, as well as for the forces underlying this link. Conceptually, the analysis is motivated by the observa-
tions that the disruptions related to the Covid-19 pandemic pertain to several established determinants of
social unrest that comprise personal grievances related to economic hardship, for instance due to job loss, or
to a negative economic outlook. Looming existential threats and intensifying socio-economic and political
divides imply that the pandemic may trigger increasing social unrest by intensifying some of these root
causes of social unrest. Our analysis is based on a unique combination of nationally representative weekly
survey data collected during the pandemic with measures of the consequences of the pandemic such as daily
data on Covid-19-related deaths on the state level, state-level statistics on unemployment, and geo-localized
event-level data on protests and riots at a weekly resolution. The analysis covers the first Covid-19 phase
(February through August, 2020) and accounts for the development of social unrest over the same months
during 2018 and 2019.
The results establish several novel findings regarding the link between negative emotional stress, economic
perceptions related to the pandemic, and social unrest. First, we find evidence that individual job loss in
the context of the Covid-19 pandemic leads to an increased prevalence of negative emotional stress, anxiety,
and aggression, as well as to increasingly negative perceptions of the state of the economy. These effects are
largely unaffected by political polarization, as reflected by party affiliation or alignment of party preferences
with the party of the state governor. Second, we document that similar effects emerge at the state-week-
level when considering variation in deaths related to Covid-19 and in unemployment rates. In contrast to
effects related to individual unemployment, here, we also find systematic effect heterogeneity for political
1See, e.g., a recent op-ed in Foreign Policy by Elise Labott.
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polarization along party lines. Third, we find that an increase in negative emotional stress is associated
with a significant increase in the incidence of social unrest at the state-week level. The estimates show
that negative emotional stress and negative perceptions about the economy are intensified by the severity of
the crisis. Greater negative emotional stress – but not more negative perceptions about the economy – was
associated with more social unrest. This effect is strongest in environments with a more pronounced increase
in unemployment and Covid-19 fatalities, and with high political polarization as proxied by narrow vote
margins during the last gubernatorial election. This is consistent with collective dissent as a consequence of
a perceived decline of governmental legitimacy or diminishing confidence in the administrative capabilities
to combat the pandemic.
The results suggest that the social and psychological consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic were asso-
ciated with increased social unrest, in line with recent concerns (see, e.g., Censolo & Morelli 2020, Galea &
Abdalla 2020). Our results provide a link between increased aggression levels during the pandemic-related
lockdown (Killgore et al. 2021, Lang & Lang 2021), increasing depression rates and a deterioration of mental
health (Giuntella et al. 2021), and social unrest, and they provide evidence for the underlying psychological
mechanism. The findings thereby also complement evidence about the effect of the pandemic on economic
anxiety (?) and evidence for increasing household violence during the Covid-19 pandemic (Arenas-Arroyo
et al. 2021, Bullinger et al. 2020). They also contribute to the rather unclear evidence on the link between
the pandemic and large-scale armed conflict (Mehrl & Thurner 2020, Bloem & Salemi 2021) and to emerging
evidence for increased social unrest related to Covid-19 in Africa, which was mainly due to the stringency of
state reactions (Basedau & Deitch 2021). Complementing work on mass polarization of citizen’s positions
in the past decades (see, e.g., Fiorina & Abrams 2008, Callander & Carbajal 2021), our estimates show that
the pandemic and political polarization interact in the context of social unrest, with significant consequences
for the adherence to policies such as social distancing (Allcott et al. 2020, Grossman et al. 2020).
The finding that social unrest can be traced to the disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic support
the role of personal grievances as cause for collective dissent (Grasso & Giugni 2016), consistent with
evidence for aggravated grievances as reflected by a negative perception of the economy (Coibion et al.
2020b,a), a further widening of socio-ethnic inequalities (Andrasfay & Goldman 2021), and health-related
stress (Cervellati et al. 2021). In light of evidence that the economic consequences of the pandemic are more
widespread across age and regional groups than initial mortality impacts (Polyakova et al. 2020), our results
potentially only capture the tip of the iceberg in terms of the social implications of the Covid-19 pandemic.
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Moreover, our findings contribute to recent evidence that suggests that political polarization can lead to
different interpretations of the same facts and policies related to the pandemic in various domains (Hersh
& Goldenberg 2016, Bisgaard 2019, Calvillo et al. 2020, Gollwitzer et al. 2020, Lockhart et al. 2020). Our
findings document that comparable variation in unemployment or fatalities related to the pandemic entails
very different consequences for social unrest depending on the political and economic context.
Our study also contributes to the literature on the link between epidemics and social unrest (see, e.g.,
Jedwab et al. 2021, for a survey of historical cases). Existing evidence in this literature has mainly focused
on epidemics and social violence in Africa (e.g., Cervellati et al. 2021, Cordell et al. 2021). Likewise, our
findings complement macro-level evidence that suggests a link between epidemics and civil disorder world-
wide (Sedik & Xu 2020). Our empirical strategy contributes to this emerging literature by isolating the
causal relation between Covid-19 and social unrest in the U.S. and by shedding light on the underlying
psychological forces.
In the remainder of the paper, we briefly discuss the data and methodology, present the results, and
provide a brief discussion.
2 Data
Data The analysis combines survey data collected by the Gallup Covid-Survey 2020 between March
and August 2020 with data on reported deaths related to the Covid-19 pandemic (https://github.com/
datasets/covid-19), data on unemployment from the US Bureau of Labor statistics and with data on
events of social unrest from the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT). In particular,
the analysis is based on protest events (event category 14). Despite potential deficiencies (Wang et al.
2016), these event data constitute the best available data source for the purpose of this analysis, which
relies on high frequency (week-by-week-by-state) variation and an estimation strategy that flexibly accounts
for potential confounders.
Empirical Methodology The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In a first step, we document on
the individual level that a job loss during the Covid-19 pandemic affected respondents’ overall sentiments. In
the second step of the analysis, we use a similar approach to consider the socio-psychological effects of visible
aggregate consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic on individual sentiments. The third step of the analysis
investigates whether sentiments affect social unrest. In all three steps of the analysis, identification relies on
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pre-determined variables of interest, which, on the second and third step of the analysis, are measured at
the state level. This and the inclusion of a rich set of control variables that are predetermined at the time
of measurement of the outcome, state and week fixed effects, as well as the explicit inclusion of potential
correlation in the error at the state-week or state-month level, respectively, rules out concerns of endogeneity
or reverse causality. The next section presents methods in detail and the corresponding results.
3 Results
Pandemic-related unemployment shocks and sentiments. We start by presenting evidence on
whether personal unemployment experience affects respondents’ sentiments at the individual level. The
corresponding analysis is based on estimates of an empirical model
SENTi,s,t = α+ βUEi,s,t−1 + ξ
′Xi,s,t + πt + λs + εi,s,t , (1)
with SENTi,s,t denoting a binary dependent variable that measures the prevalence of negative sentiments,
in terms of i) negative emotional stress or ii) a negative perception of the economy, for respondent i in
week t in state s. Negative emotional stress is coded in terms of a binary variable that equals 1 if the
principal-component score of negative emotional stress – based on survey responses to questions about anger,
stress, worries, sadness, boredom, and loneliness – in the GALLUP-2020 (GALLUP 2020) questionnaire by
respondent i in state s and calendar week t is in the top quartile, 0 otherwise.2 Negative perception of the
economy is a binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent reported to perceive the US economy to be in a
depression, 0 otherwise (GALLUP 2020, item C13). UEi,s,t−1 is a pre-determined binary indicator whether
the respondent reported a job loss during the previous week. Xi,s,t is a vector of controls at the respondent-
level, including household income, family status, children, educational attainment, ethnicity, age, a dummy
indicating Republican affiliation, and a binary variable indicating political opposition to the state governor’s
party affiliation, where opposition is defined as being affiliated with the opposite party, or, for independents,
when the governor is Republican. The vector Xi,s,t also includes controls for aggregate variation, including
pandemic-related stay-at-home orders and social unrest in the week before the interview. Week (πt) and
state (λs) fixed-effects control for unobserved heterogeneity across time and regions. The error term εi,s,t
allows for arbitrary correlation (clustering) at the state-week level.
The experience of a job loss during the pandemic as reported in survey responses was associated with
a significant intensification of negative emotional stress (Table 1 Panel A). A similar effect is found for
2Detailed results for all components are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
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responses regarding negative perceptions of the economy in terms of a depression (Table 1 Panel B). In
both cases, this estimate is affected only weakly by respondents’ political stance, in terms of considering
an individual whose party affiliation does not align with the affiliation of the state governor (opposition) or
party affiliation of the respondent (Republican or other).
Exposure to Covid-19 and sentiments. In the second step of the analysis, we consider the effects of
exposure to Covid-19, measured in terms of state-level fatalities and unemployment, on individual emotions
and perceptions. The corresponding analysis is based on estimates of an empirical model
SENTi,s,t = α+ βCOV IDs,t−1 + ξ
′Xi,s,t + πt + λs + εi,s,t , (2)
with COV IDs,t−1 as a measure of exposure to the Covid-19 epidemic in terms of its consequences for public
health and the economy. Exposure to Covid-19 is based on two proxies, state level unemployment and the
rate of Covid-19-related fatalities, measured in state s for the preceding week t−1. Both proxies are highly
visible, being permanently featured in the media, and pre-determined. In particular, we consider a measure
of the consequences of the pandemic on public health in terms of a binary variable indicating a relatively
high increase in the Covid-19 death rate (an increase in the death rate > 9 per 1m from week t−2 to t−1,
which corresponds to the median for the time period March through August), and the effect on the economy,
as reflected by high unemployment (a monthly unemployment rate higher than 7%, which approximately
corresponds to the sample median), at the state level.3 The use of binary variables provides a useful source
of variation without relying on a linear specification; the dynamics of the Covid-19 pandemic are clearly
visible in the data (see Appendix Figure B.1).
The results suggest that individual reactions are more polarized when considering exposure proxied by
aggregate variables than when considering individual unemployment experience as above. In particular,
increases in Covid-19 deaths at the state level are associated with a significant surge in negative emotional
stress, whereas state-level unemployment rates do not affect emotions on average (Figure 1(a), specification
1). At the same time, reactions to aggregate variation instead of individual experiences are more sensitive
to partisanship. When considering heterogeneity by alignment of party affiliation with that of the state
governor, there is no significant interaction with Covid-19 deaths on negative emotional stress, whereas
increases in state-level unemployment intensify negative emotional stress among individuals in opposition
3We update the monthly unemployment by using the previous month’s unemployment rate for the first 3 weeks of a month
and the contemporary rate for weeks 4 and 5.
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Table 1: Association of individual unemployment experience with negative emotional stress and perception
of the economy
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Negative emotionsa
unemployed in t−1c 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.114***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
unemployed in t−1 =0.008
× oppositiond (0.013)
unemployed in t−1 0.026*
× Republicane (0.015)
opposition 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Republican =0.086*** =0.086*** =0.087***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
stay-at-home 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
social unrest in t−1 0.010 0.010 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
add. controls yes yes yes
state, week FEs yes yes yes
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044
mean dep. var. 0.226 0.226 0.226
N 70,789 70,789 70,789
Panel B. Negative perception of economyb
unemployed in t−1c 0.071*** 0.080*** 0.074***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
unemployed in t−1 =0.021
× oppositiond (0.013)
unemployed in t−1 =0.009
× Republicane (0.013)
opposition =0.004 =0.002 =0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Republican =0.173*** =0.172*** =0.172***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
stay-at-home 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
social unrest in t−1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
add. controls yes yes yes
state, week FEs yes yes yes
R2 0.072 0.072 0.072
mean dep. var. 0.266 0.266 0.266
N 72,285 72,285 72,285
Notes: Results of linear probability models. All specifications include state and week fixed effects and the full set
of controls. Standard errors, clustered on the state-week level, in parentheses, *, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. a binary dependent variable (mean 0.226). b binary dependent variable
(mean 0.266). c Binary variable indicating individual unemployment status in t−1. Variable is equal to 1 if the
respondent reported to be unemployed, 0 otherwise (GALLUP 2020, item E1 3). d Binary variable equal to 1 if
the respondent reports party affiliation different than state governor’s party (for non-affiliates, opposition is coded
when being resident in state with Republican governor). e Binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports
affiliation with Republican party.
to the state governor (spec. 2). Party affiliation affects the emotional response to Covid-19 deaths and
unemployment, with Republican-leaning respondents showing significantly stronger responses in terms of
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spec. 1: plain spec. 2: opposition spec. 3: republican
estimates COVID-19 deaths estimates unemployment rate 95%-CI









































spec. 1: plain spec. 2: opposition spec. 3: republican
estimates COVID-19 deaths estimates unemployment rate 95%-CI
(b) Negative perception of economy
Notes: Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Estimation model for specification 1 (plain) as described
in equation 2. Specifications 2 and 3 include interactions of COV IDs,t−1 and UNEMPs,t−1 with a binary variable
indicating opposition (spec. 2) or a Republican affiliation indicator (spec. 3). Confidence intervals are based on
standard errors that are clustered on the state-week level. Detailed estimates are reported in Table A.2 of the
Supplementary Appendix.
negative emotional stress to both types of events (spec. 3).4
The general association between Covid-19 casualties or unemployment and negative economic perceptions
is weaker, but this conceals a considerable heterogeneity in the effects. The findings show that a high
number of Covid-19-related deaths or high unemployment at the state level are not associated with a worse
perception of the economy on average (Figure 1(b), spec. 1). Yet, a high number of Covid-19 deaths is
associated with a more pessimistic economic outlook of respondents who are in opposition with the governor;
the corresponding effect for unemployment is insignificant (spec. 2). Both a high level of Covid-19-related
deaths and unemployment at the state level, induce less of a negative perception of the economy among
respondents who report an affiliation with the Republican party (spec. 3). This heterogeneity contrasts the
heterogeneity found for negative emotional stress in Figure 1(a); the results suggest that the consequences
of the pandemic in the economic and public health domain led to a greater prevalence of negative emotional
stress and, to a lesser extent, of negative economic expectations, but the heterogeneity of these reactions
reveals a widening of political divides and thus in the scope for social unrest.
Robustness checks using a binary dependent variable based on the PCA score of the second component
4This corresponds to results by Meeuwis et al. (2020) who find that after the unexpected election of Donald Trump Democrats
became more pessimistic (and Republicans became more optimistic) with respect to the economy; at the same time, there were
no systematic differences in expectations about their own personal situations. See also Prior et al. (2015) on partisan beliefs
about the economy.
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yield no comparably systematic and significant results, suggesting that the psychological fall-out of the
epidemic mainly pertains to anger-related negative emotional stress (angry, stressed, worried, sad) rather
than introvertive negative emotions (boredom and loneliness).5
Sentiments and social unrest. The last step of the analysis investigates the link between sentiments
and social unrest. In particular, we consider the association of protest events at the state-week-level with
variation in negative emotional stress and perceptions expressed in the survey responses during the preceding
week. The estimation analysis is based on weekly counts of social unrest as outcome variable and controls for
stay-at-home orders that might have affected social unrest, as well as for nation-wide events unrelated to the
Covid-19 pandemic, such as the Black Lives Matter movement (Dave et al. 2020), which gained momentum
during the sample period. The corresponding analysis for this link between socio-psychological factors and
unrest is based on the empirical model
Unrests,t = γ0 + γ1SENTs,t−1 + φ
′Xs,t + ρt + λs + εs,t , (3)
with Unrests,t denoting the total number of registered events of social unrest in week t and state s in the
GDELT data, SENTs,t−1 is a measure of sentiments in terms of negative emotional stress or economic
perceptions as detailed in the figure notes. The vector Xs,t includes state-week specific controls: To account
for long-term trends in social unrest, we use 2018 and 2019 events in the same category, state and time
period as additional controls. In addition, as the main variable of interest is measured in t−1, we include
the recorded number of protests in week t−2 as a control variable. We control for the unemployment rate
and death rate in weeks t to account for the dynamics of the pandemic. Week (ρt) and state (λs) fixed-effects
are also included. The error term εs,m,t allows for arbitrary correlation (clustering) at the state-month level.
The estimates document that, on average, the prevalence of negative emotional stress in a particular
week and state exhibits a significant positive association with the occurrence of events of social unrest
(Figure 2(a), pooled). With an increase in social unrest, measured by GDELT protest events, of 1.3 percent
in response to an increase in the prevalence of negative emotional stress in the population by 1 percentage
point, this effect is sizable. It is remarkable, that this effect does not arise in situations with low political
polarization and in environments with a relatively low level of Covid-19-related fatalities. On the other hand,
the association between negative emotional stress and social unrest is systematically stronger in states and
5See Table A.1 in the Appendix for the details of the factor analysis and Table A.4 for the corresponding estimation results
for the second component. Unreported results also suggest no systematic heterogeneity in the effects for African American
respondents.
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Figure 2: Negative emotions, economic perceptions, and social unrest
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(a) Association of negative emotional stress (PCA) with so-
cial unrest
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(b) Association of economic perception with social unrest
Notes: Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Coefficient estimates are derived from weighted least squares
regressions of equation 3, weighted by the standard deviation of the dependent variable on the state-week level. Only state-
week combinations with more than 10 valid survey responses for both types of sentiments are considered. Washington D.C. is
excluded. Semi-elasticity (calculated using the unweighted mean of the respective sample as the base) multiplied by 100 gives
the percentage change in the specific rate (ratio) due to a one percentage point increase in the mean of the PCA and economic
perception variables. Standard errors are clustered at the state-month level. Detailed estimates are reported in Table A.3 of
the Supplementary Appendix.
weeks in which unemployment rates exceed 7%, which approximately corresponds to the sample median,
while there is no significant link between negative emotional stress and social unrest in a low unemployment
context. A similar heterogeneity emerges for differences in (cumulative) Covid-19 deaths. In states and weeks
in which the growth in the death rate was larger than 9 per 1m, which is about the median for the time
period March through August, the link between average prevalence of negative emotional stress and social
unrest is positive and significant, in contrast to environments with a low number of cumulated deaths. The
effect heterogeneity in the link between negative emotional stress and social unrest also pertains to political
polarization. In particular, in states with high polarization as reflected by a low vote margin between
Democrats and Republicans during the most recent gubernatorial election, a higher average prevalence of
negative emotional stress is associated with a significantly higher incidence of social unrest, whereas this
link is insignificant in states with a high vote margin.
When considering economic perceptions, the results reveal no significant link between average economic
perceptions and social unrest (Figure 2(b), pooled). While qualitatively similar, the patterns of heterogeneity
in the association between economic perceptions and social unrest is quantitatively weaker and not statis-
tically significant. This evidence suggests that social unrest is more closely associated with psychological
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factors related to negative emotional stress, than with economic perceptions and expectations.6
4 Discussion
The evidence presented here suggests that the psychological fall-out of the Covid-19 pandemic in terms of
an increased prevalence of negative emotional stress exhibits a significant association with increased social
unrest. The corresponding association between perceptions of the state of the economy and social unrest is
found to be insignificant. The effect heterogeneity indicates that political polarization acts as catalyst that
contributes to increased economic and political tensions: the association between negative emotional stress
and social unrest is primarily found in the context of high unemployment or high Covid-19 fatalities or in
situations of high political polarization at the state level.
The finding of effect heterogeneity does not hinge on the particular specification of the thresholds for
unemployment and Covid-19 fatalities used to partition the sample (see Appendix Figures B.2 and B.3).
Likewise, the findings are not sensitive to dropping particular states (see Appendix Figure B.4 and B.5).
The simultaneous occurrences of social unrest related to police violence and the Black Lives Matter
movement has been viewed as part of a broader process of deepening racial and socio-economic divides that
has been accelerated and exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic (Galea & Abdalla 2020). The estimation results
are unlikely to be affected by outbreaks of violence at selective dates, such as in the aftermath of the killing
of George Floyd, due to the inclusion of state and week fixed effects that account for the spatial and temporal
concentration of such events. In addition, seasonal trends in social unrest are accounted for by controlling for
events during the same periods in years 2018 and 2019. Nevertheless, we conducted several robustness checks
to explore whether the main finding in fact masks the rise in social unrest related to the Black Lives Matter
movement. Estimation results of extended specifications deliver no evidence for systematic heterogeneity in
the effects of negative emotional stress on social violence across states with low or high population shares of
Afro-Americans; if anything, the results are slightly weaker in states with higher population shares, pointing
in the opposite direction (see Appendix Table A.6). Additional results document that the main findings are
robust when using a more extensive specification of the empirical model (see Appendix Tables A.7 and A.8).
Table A.7 shows that negative emotional stress is significantly correlated with social unrest whether or not
fixed effects for states or weeks (Cols. (1) - (3)) are introduced. To control for the prevalence of Black Lives
6While the baseline analysis is based on a binary variable indicating negative emotional stress, we also estimated a model
using the state-week average of the continuous measure for bad emotions (i.e., the PCA score) as the explanatory variable to
explore the robustness of our findings. The corresponding estimates confirm all findings presented in Figure 2, see Table A.5 in
the Appendix.
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Matter protests, in Cols (4) and (5) we include specific state-level control variables, like population, density,
the share of black population, crime and imprison rates as well as the poverty rate. The results also remain
unchanged when including a dummy for states and weeks when the Black Lives Matter protests were most
severe (Col. (6)). The same holds when excluding entire state-weeks (Col. (7)) or states (Col (8)) in which
BLM protests have been severe.
In sum, the results suggest that an increasing discontent with existing socio-economic living conditions
might have been spurred by the consequences of Covid-19, with the result of an increasing prevalence of
negative emotional stress, which is associated with greater social unrest. Hence, while the evidence shown
here does not necessarily reflect causal effects, the fine grained data structure and the use of predetermined
within-state and -week variation provides novel insights into the link between the Covid-19 pandemic and
outbreaks of social unrest that complement recent findings regarding the role of Covid-19 for affective
polarization (see, e.g., Druckman et al. 2021).
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A Appendix: Additional Results







Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
high unemployment high deaths
Notes: The graph illustrates the mean of the binary variable indicating high COVID-19 deaths, as well as the
unemployment rate for months February through August 2021.
Table A.1: Principle component analysis
Variable Comp. 1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 Comp. 5 Comp. 6
angry 0.3882 =0.2545 0.6857 0.3972 0.3927 =0.0491
stressed 0.4562 =0.2694 =0.5176 0.0476 0.3046 0.5969
worried 0.4924 =0.2202 =0.3767 0.0835 =0.1478 =0.7337
sad 0.4765 =0.0351 0.3141 =0.2894 =0.7147 0.2801
bored 0.2184 0.7254 =0.1161 0.6167 =0.1555 0.0900
lonely 0.3520 0.5354 0.0885 =0.6074 0.4430 =0.1283
Eigenvalues 2.3988 1.1255 0.7842 0.6990 0.5553 0.4373
Notes: N = 101, 302, all variables are binary and taken from the GALLUP (2020) survey.
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Table A.2: Association of unemployment and COVID-19 shocks on negative emotional stress and perception
of the economy - full estimation results for Figure 1 in manuscript
negative emotional stressa economic perceptionb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
high deaths in t−1c 0.009** 0.008* 0.004 0.003 =0.004 0.008**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
high unemp. in t−1d 0.004 =0.001 =0.005 0.005 0.008 0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
high deaths in t−1 0.000 0.017***
× opposition (0.006) (0.006)
high unemp. in t−1 0.012* =0.007
× opposition (0.006) (0.007)
high deaths in t−1 0.014** =0.017**
× Republican (0.006) (0.007)
high unemp. in t−1 0.028*** =0.016**
× Republican (0.006) (0.007)
opposition 0.003 =0.004 0.002 =0.006* =0.012** =0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Republican =0.098*** =0.098*** =0.125*** =0.169*** =0.170*** =0.148***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
stay-at-homef =0.001 =0.001 =0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
social unrest in t−1g 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
social unrest 2018/2019 yes yes yes yes yes yes
add. controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
week FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
state FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.065 0.065 0.065
Mean dep. var. 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.263 0.263 0.263
N 90,396 92,277
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered on the state-week level, are presented in parentheses, stars indicate significance: *,
** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. Estimation model is
as described in equation 1. All result correspond to those illustrated in Figure 1.
a The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the PCA score of negative emotional stress according to the GALLUP-2020 survey
is in the top quartile, 0 if in the lower 3 quartiles. b The dependent variable is equal to 1 the GALLUP-2020 survey
respondent reported to perceive the US economy to be in a recession, 0 otherwise. c Binary variable equal to 1 if the change
in the observed cumulative COVID-19 related death rate from t−2 to t−1 (deaths per 1m state population) is above 9, 0
otherwise. d Binary variable equal to 1 if the observed unemployment rate of a particular week in a particular state is above
the median nation-wirde unemployment rate (∼ 7) during weeks 4–35, 0 otherwise. e Binary variable indicating individual
unemployment status. Variable is equal to 1 if the respondent reported to be unemployed, 0 otherwise. f Binary variable
equal to 1 if observed week was affected by state-wide stay-at-home order in t−1, 0 otherwise. g social unrest as recorded
by GDELT category 14, rescaled by 1000. States-week combinations with only selected counties affected by stay-at-home
order are coded as 0. Additional controls on respondent-level include household income, family status, children, educational
attainment, ethnicity, and age.
16
Table A.3: Association of negative emotion and negative perception of the economy and social unrest - full estimation output for Figure 2 in manuscript
unemployment COVID-19 deaths vote margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pooled low high low high low high
Panel A. Negative emotions and political protesta
avg. negative emotions (PCA)a 1.443** 0.033 2.241** 0.228 2.886** 2.061* 0.561
(0.716) (0.242) (1.052) (0.634) (1.235) (1.086) (0.906)
semi elasticityc [1.3] [0.2] [2.5] [0.3] [2.1] [2.1] [0.5]
unemployment rate t−1 =4.228 0.216 =10.593* =0.123 =4.429 =4.842 =4.512
(3.540) (0.754) (5.734) (3.196) (3.855) (4.368) (6.785)
death rate t−1 0.057 =0.009 0.040 =0.036 0.128 =0.043 0.093
(0.054) (0.022) (0.179) (0.023) (0.100) (0.047) (0.078)
social unrest t−2 0.151** 0.166 0.083 0.293*** 0.084 0.114 0.181**
(0.060) (0.141) (0.070) (0.107) (0.078) (0.078) (0.070)
social unrest 2018 & 2019 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
week FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.497 0.829 0.507 0.531 0.553 0.393 0.581
Panel B. Negative perception of the economy and political protestb
avg. economic perception (BAD ECON)b 1.114 =0.334 1.560 =0.385 2.317 1.233 1.140
(0.972) (0.214) (1.438) (0.414) (2.236) (2.029) (0.744)
semi elasticityc [1.0] [=0.9] [0.9] [=0.5] [1.7] [1.2] [0.9]
unemployment rate t−1 =2.397 0.099 =9.751* 2.990 =3.762 =5.501 0.057
(3.516) (0.673) (5.624) (3.236) (3.815) (5.756) (4.769)
death rate t−1 0.062 0.000 0.009 =0.036 0.106 0.002 0.084
(0.049) (0.023) (0.154) (0.027) (0.075) (0.067) (0.068)
social unrest t−2 0.168*** 0.210 0.072 0.345*** 0.101 0.135* 0.206***
(0.060) (0.145) (0.073) (0.114) (0.080) (0.080) (0.063)
social unrest 2018 & 2019 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
week FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.454 0.840 0.477 0.520 0.514 0.359 0.565
Observations 1,052 343 709 440 612 539 513
Notes: Estimation results corresponding to Figure 2 in the manuscript. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, stars indicate significance: *, ** and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. All estimates are derived from weighted least squares regression, weighting by the
standard deviation of the dependent variable at the state-week level. Estimation model is as described in equation 2. All result correspond to those illustrated in Figure 2. The same
definitions of high/low Covid-19 deaths and unemployment rate are used as in Table A.2. The vote margin split is defined along the across-state median of the margin of the most
recent gubernatorial elections. a Mean negative emotional stress reported on state-week level in percent. It measures the percentage of respondents in GALLUP-20 who registered a
PCA score in the upper quartile. b The economic perception variable measures the percentage of GALLUP-2020 survey respondents who reported to perceive the US economy to be
in a recession. c Semi-elasticity (calculated using the unweighted mean of the respective sample as the base) multiplied by 100 gives the percentage change in the specific rate (ratio)
due to an one percentage point increase in the mean of the PCA and economic perception variables.
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high deaths in t−1c 0.002 =0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
high unemp. in t−1d 0.000 =0.001 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
high deaths in t−1 0.009
× opposition (0.008)
high unemp. in t−1 0.001
× opposition (0.008)
high deaths in t−1 0.005
× Republican (0.008)
high unemp. in t−1 =0.020**
× Republican (0.008)
opposition 0.004 =0.002 0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Republican 0.007** 0.007* 0.017**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
stay-at-homef 0.011* 0.011* 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
social unrest in t−1 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
social unrest 2018/2019 yes yes yes
add. controls yes yes yes
week FEs yes yes yes
state FEs yes yes yes
R2 0.031 0.031 0.031
Mean dep. var. 0.234 0.234 0.234
N 90,396
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered on the state-week level, are presented
in parentheses, stars indicate significance: *, ** and *** indicate statistical sig-
nificance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. Estimation
model is as described in equation 1. All result correspond to those illustrated
in Figure 1.
a The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the PCA score of the second com-
ponent of negative emotional stress according to the GALLUP-2020 survey is
in the top quartile, 0 if in the lower 3 quartiles. c Binary variable equal to 1
if the observed cumulative COVID-19 related death rate (deaths per 1m state
population) is above the median (∼ 70), 0 otherwise. d Binary variable equal to
1 if the observed unemployment rate of a particular week in a particular state
is above the median nation-wirde unemployment rate (∼ 7.5) during weeks 4–
35, 0 otherwise. e Binary variable indicating individual unemployment status.
Variable is equal to 1 if the respondent reported to be unemployed, 0 other-
wise. f Binary variable equal to 1 if observed week was affected by state-wide
stay-at-home order, 0 otherwise. g political protest as recorded by GDELT
category 14, rescaled by 1000. States-week combinations with only selected
counties affected by stay-at-home order are coded as 0. Additional controls on
respondent-level include household income, family status, children, educational
attainment, ethnicity, and age.
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Table A.5: Association of negative emotion and social unrest - continuous measure of negative emotional stress (PCA score)
unemployment COVID-19 deaths vote margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pooled low high low high low high
avg. negative emotions (PCA)a 70.960** =2.474 94.313** 18.807 115.409** 87.299* 41.772
(30.231) (5.741) (43.363) (18.504) (52.487) (50.161) (31.408)
unemployment rate t−1 =4.296 0.218 =9.845* =0.095 =4.503 =4.865 =4.287
(3.547) (0.725) (5.548) (3.123) (3.779) (4.539) (6.578)
death rate t−1 0.061 =0.007 0.038 =0.037 0.137 =0.029 0.096
(0.054) (0.022) (0.171) (0.023) (0.099) (0.052) (0.078)
social unrest t−2 0.143** 0.158 0.080 0.286*** 0.079 0.109 0.175**
(0.060) (0.142) (0.069) (0.107) (0.078) (0.080) (0.070)
social unrest 2018 & 2019 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
week FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.494 0.823 0.505 0.530 0.553 0.393 0.581
Observations 1,052 343 709 440 612 539 513
Notes: Estimation results corresponding to Figure 2 in the manuscript. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, stars indicate
significance: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. All estimates are derived from weighted least
squares regression, weighting by the standard deviation of the dependent variable at the state-week level. Estimation model is as described in equation 2. All result
correspond to those illustrated in Figure 2. The same definitions of high/low Covid-19 deaths and unemployment rate are used as in Table A.2. The vote margin split
is defined along the across-state median of the margin of the most recent gubernatorial elections. a Mean score (by state-week) core calculated from component 1 of
the principal component analysis for all 6 GALLUP-2020 items indicating negative emotional stress, mean −0.090 (st.dev. 0.306).
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Table A.6: Association of negative emotion and social unrest - interaction Afro-American population
unemployment COVID-19 deaths vote margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
pooled low high low high low high
avg. negative emotions (PCA)a 1.791** =0.223 2.969** 0.115 3.606** 2.169* 1.176
(0.870) (0.236) (1.344) (0.669) (1.671) (1.249) (1.175)
avg. negative emotions =1.387 1.481 =2.563 0.773 =2.086 =0.618 =1.791
× high Afro American pop.b (1.508) (0.978) (2.129) (1.426) (2.372) (1.745) (2.350)
additional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
week FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.497 0.831 0.508 0.531 0.553 0.393 0.582
Observations 1,052 343 709 440 612 539 513
Notes: Estimation results corresponding to Figure 2 in the manuscript. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses, stars
indicate significance: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level. All estimates are derived
from weighted least squares regression, weighting by the standard deviation of the dependent variable at the state-week level. Estimation model is as
described in equation 2. All result correspond to those illustrated in Figure 2. The same definitions of high/low Covid-19 deaths and unemployment
rate are used as in Table A.2. The vote margin split is defined along the across-state median of the margin of the most recent gubernatorial elections.
a Mean score (by state-week) core calculated from component 1 of the principal component analysis for all 6 GALLUP-2020 items indicating negative
emotional stress, mean −0.090 (st.dev. 0.306). b Interaction of PCA variable with a binary variable indicating a high share of Afro American population
in the observed state. Threshold value is 14%, the mean of the Afro American population (according to the 2019 census) is 13.4%.
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Table A.7: Association of negative emotional stress (PCA) and social unrest – alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PCA 1.796** 1.443** 1.455* 2.149*** 2.201*** 1.972*** 1.465** 2.028**
(0.739) (0.716) (0.826) (0.780) (0.778) (0.757) (0.647) (0.876)
social unrest t−2 0.246*** 0.151** 0.150** 0.210*** 0.205*** 0.189*** 0.268*** 0.225***
(0.047) (0.060) (0.061) (0.048) (0.049) (0.052) (0.049) (0.073)
unemp. rate t−1 =4.228 =4.296 =4.033 =3.102 =3.153 =0.340 =2.385
(3.540) (3.612) (3.193) (2.940) (2.658) (1.278) (2.282)
death. rate t−1 0.057 0.065 0.061 0.060 0.058 0.003 0.047
(0.054) (0.057) (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.013) (0.046)
state pop. (mio.) 10.272*** 10.991*** 9.868*** 7.949** 10.604**
(2.971) (3.106) (3.099) (3.418) (5.025)
pop. density =0.083** =0.119** =0.077*** =0.039*** =0.073**
(0.033) (0.046) (0.029) (0.015) (0.035)
black share =95.150 1.944 =98.140 =53.985 =113.856
(65.423) (73.142) (62.683) (48.254) (72.239)
Republican =42.472** =38.633** =45.492*** =30.291*** =15.798
(17.044) (15.443) (17.101) (10.745) (11.560)
vote margin 0.707 0.691 0.659 0.585 0.404
(0.535) (0.524) (0.561) (0.514) (0.673)
stay-at-home =12.656 =13.951 =0.891 20.084 4.176









week FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state FEs no yes yes no no no no no
week*black-share FEs no no yes no no no no no
N 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 993 678
R2 0.423 0.497 0.498 0.458 0.460 0.476 0.490 0.488
Notes: Robust standard errors, are presented in parentheses, stars indicate significance: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and
1-percent level. Specification (2) is our main specification as presented in equation 2.
Additional state-level control variables in specification (5) are derived from d the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Data are available at https://eu.usatoday.com/
story/money/2020/01/13/most-dangerous-states-in-america-violent-crime-murder-rate/40968963/
The variable strong BLM is equal to 1 if the increase in registered political protest at the beginning of the Black Lives Matter protest was larger than 11, 0 otherwise.
Specification (7) is estimated using model (4) without state-weeks that are strongly affected by the Black Lives Matter protests.
Specification (8) is estimated using model (4) without states that are above-median affected by the Black Lives Matter protests.
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Table A.8: Association of negative perception of the economy and social unrest – alternative specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PCA 1.121 1.040 1.134 1.334 1.360 1.226 0.153 0.754
(0.758) (0.935) (1.015) (0.878) (0.827) (0.821) (0.517) (0.826)
social unrest t−2 0.246*** 0.152** 0.151** 0.211*** 0.206*** 0.190*** 0.267*** 0.224***
(0.046) (0.060) (0.060) (0.047) (0.048) (0.052) (0.050) (0.074)
unemp. rate t−1 =4.089 =4.103 =4.066 =3.110 =3.179 =0.195 =2.253
(3.456) (3.513) (3.266) (2.987) (2.720) (1.250) (2.304)
death. rate t−1 0.053 0.060 0.062 0.061 0.059 0.002 0.046
(0.053) (0.056) (0.042) (0.042) (0.039) (0.013) (0.047)
state pop. (mio.) 10.276*** 10.945*** 9.870*** 7.844** 10.634**
(2.985) (3.113) (3.113) (3.437) (5.070)
pop. density =0.080** =0.113** =0.074** =0.032** =0.067*
(0.034) (0.046) (0.030) (0.014) (0.035)
black share =88.050 0.341 =91.608 =61.509 =111.747
(63.256) (72.667) (60.806) (48.638) (70.421)
Republican =41.135** =37.695** =44.274*** =31.928*** =15.402
(16.832) (15.719) (16.750) (11.313) (12.534)
vote margin 0.622 0.630 0.581 0.558 0.304
(0.524) (0.522) (0.549) (0.503) (0.634)
stay-at-home =13.455 =14.590 =1.563 21.153 4.685









week FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
state FEs no yes yes no no no no no
week*black-share FEs no no yes no no no no no
N 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 993 678
R2 0.422 0.496 0.498 0.456 0.459 0.475 0.488 0.486
Notes: Robust standard errors, are presented in parentheses, stars indicate significance: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and
1-percent level. Specification (2) is our main specification as presented in equation 2.
Additional state-level control variables in specification (5) are derived from d the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program. Data are available at https://eu.usatoday.com/
story/money/2020/01/13/most-dangerous-states-in-america-violent-crime-murder-rate/40968963/
The variable strong BLM is equal to 1 if the increase in registered political protest at the beginning of the Black Lives Matter protest was larger than 11, 0 otherwise.
Specification (7) is estimated using model (4) without state-weeks that are strongly affected by the Black Lives Matter protests.
Specification (8) is estimated using model (4) without states that are above-median affected by the Black Lives Matter protests.
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Figure B.2: Robustness: Effect of negative emotional stress (PCA) on social unrest for different thresholds
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Notes: Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating model 2 for different thresholds in
high/low unemployment.
Figure B.3: Robustness: Effect of BAD ECON on social unrest for different thresholds of unemployment









>6% >6.5% >7% >7.5% >8%










>5 >7 >9 >11 >13
estimate low deaths estimate high deaths 95%-CI
(b) Covid-19 deaths
Notes: Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating model 2 for different thresholds in
high/low unemployment.
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Notes: Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating model 2 with the sequential omission
of 1 state out of 50 US states in our data.
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Notes: Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from estimating model 2 with the sequential omission
of 1 state out of 50 US states in our data.
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